1-1-1997

Of 'Subtle Prejudices,' White Supremacy and Affirmative Action: A
Reply to Paul Butler
Margaret E. Montoya
University of New Mexico - School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_facultyscholarship
Part of the Law and Gender Commons, and the Law and Race Commons

Recommended Citation
Margaret E. Montoya, Of 'Subtle Prejudices,' White Supremacy and Affirmative Action: A Reply to Paul
Butler, 68 University of Colorado Law Review 891 (1997).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_facultyscholarship/223

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the UNM School of Law at UNM Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu,
lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

OF "SUBTLE PREJUDICES," WHITE
SUPREMACY, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
A REPLY TO PAUL BUTLER
MARGARETE. MONTOYA*

I.

INTRODUCTION

We are not a society with the ability to talk about race or
racism. As proof, we need only think of Professor Lani Guinier,
who attempted to talk publicly and with probity about these
topics, only to suffer rejection and humiliation. 1 In a less grand
fashion, others of us in the legal academy whose scholarly focus
is race and racism have felt enmity, disregard, or ennui from our
colleagues more often than engagement, involvement, and
common purpose. Now, enter Paul Butler with Affirmative Action
and the Criminal Law, 2 an unusually frank analysis of racism,
the criminal injustice system, and the government's duty to
correct systemic abuses through affirmative action.
Professor Butler established himself as a prominent and bold
critic of the U.S. criminal justice system when the Yale Law
Journal published his now controversial and widely noted article,
Racially Based Jury Nullification. 3 His avowed purpose of

* Associate Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Richard Delgado for his perspicacity in conceiving and convening
this symposium, where divergent opinions were respectfully debated, established
friendships were nurtured, and new relationships were begun. Thanks also to
Melissa Decker for her excellent editing and to the editorial board of the University
of Colorado Law Review for their outstanding work in organizing the symposium.
Special thanks to Paul Butler for challenging me/us to think critically about two
areas of law that are usually disconnected. My talk benefited from discussions with
Fran Ansley, Sumi Cho, Richard Gonzales, and Elizabeth Rapaport, and this article
was improved by suggestions from David Cruz, Michael Olivas, David Oppenheimer,
Ann Scales, and Christine Zuni. I also thank Mary Custy, the UNM law library
staff, and Israel Torres and Antoinette Jacques, my research assistants, for
responding quickly to my many requests. This article responds to Professor Butler's
article as revised after the symposium presentations.
1. Professor Lani Guinier's nomination to head the Civil Rights Division of the
Department of Justice was withdrawn by President Clinton after controversy arose
over her positions on race and voting rights. See David Lauter, Clinton Withdraws
Guinier as Nominee for Civil Rights Job, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1993, at Al.
2. Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
841 (1997).
3. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995).
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"subver[ting] ... the American criminal justice [system],"4 is part
of a wider scholarly and social change agenda and clearly
transcends the implementation of the six proposals he proffers in
this latest paper.
Refusing to incarcerate guilty but nonviolent African
American defendants is morally and legally compelling, Professor
Butler posits in his earlier article. 5 His proposals in this volume
pick up the argument where his earlier piece left off. Given that
the criminal justice system is riddled with racism, it is as moral
to keep nonviolent African American criminals out of prison as it
is to release them-and Professor Butler's task is to find plausible
legal arguments for the latter. Specifically, he asserts that
releasing large numbers of African Americans from prisons and
jails, limiting the startling apprehension and imprisonment rates
of African Americans for drug offenses, prohibiting the death
penalty for interracial homicides, requiring majority black juries
for judging and sentencing, and renouncing retribution are moral
and just. He then argues that these proposals can be made legal
and constitutional as well. 6 Professor Butler asserts that
affirmative action and its supporting "moral" justifications
provide the constitutional foundation for his proposals, which
seek to transform the criminal justice system until the demographics of U.S. prisons and jails "look like America." 7
Professor Butler's thesis forces us to ask some subtle and
disquieting questions about the possibility of utilizing affirmative
action jurisprudence to address the racial inequities of the
criminal justice system. The efficacy of affirmative action in the
civil arena in promoting extensive structural and institutional
Professor Butler explicitly promotes the morality of jury nullification-African
American jurors acquitting an otherwise guilty defendant-because "the black
community is better off when some nonviolent lawbreakers remain in the community
rather than go to prison." Id. at 679. He exhorts leaders in the black community to
educate potential jurors about jury nullification, which can serve as the black
community's limited but powerful mechanism for intervening in the criminal justice
system, by calling on black ministers to use their pulpits; musicians, writers,
playwrights, and rap singers to engage popular culture; and political activists to
distribute leaflets on the courthouse steps. See id. at 723. Professor Butler writes
in the hope that ''there are enough of us out there, fed up with prison as the answer
to black desperation and white supremacy, to cause retrial after retrial, until, finally,
the United States 'retries' its idea of justice." Id. at 724-25.
4. Id. at 680.
5. See id.
6. See Butler, supra note 2, at 874-88.
7. Id. at 844, 861.
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change is demonstrable. Affirmative action, especially in higher
education and private and public employment, has altered the
face of the middle class in the United States. Virtually all
colleges, universities, graduate schools, international companies·,
and smaller business enterprises are considerably more integrated today, through different forms of affirmative action, than
they were only a few decades ago. 8
New multicultural competencies, introduced and developed
by people of color and white women, are making business
enterprises more competitive in transnational and polylingual
markets. 9 Racial and cultural diversity is accepted as an aspect
of academic excellence by much of the professoriate and by large
numbers of college administrators. 10 Within the legal academy,
scholarship, teaching, and the corresponding notions of merit 11
have been transformed by expansive treatments of issues of
difference, often of and by people of color. Unconventional
scholarship in new jurisprudential movements, such as critical
race theory, critical race-feminism, radical feminism, and, more
recently, in queer theory, LatCrit, and novel pedagogical techniques, including innovations in clinical education, are among the
institutional changes wrought by the beneficiaries of affirmative
action. Social change has occurred.

8. See Manning Marable, Staying on the Path to Racial Equality, in THE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 11 (George E. Curry ed., 1996) ("Affirmative action was
largely responsible for a significant increase in the size of the black middle class; it
opened many professional and managerial positions to blacks, Latinos, and women
for the first time."). See generally Affirmative Action Update and Alert, 41 THE
EMPLOYEE ADVOCATE 2 (Supp. 1995). "One 1984 study concluded that affirmative
action had significantly reduced job segregation and improved occupational status
and mobility for minorities and women." NELA Position Paper on Affirmative
Action, supra 41 THE EMPLOYEE ADVOCATE at 4, 7 (citing CITIZEN'S COMM'N ON CML
RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO OPEN THE DOORS OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES 123-29
(1984)).
9. See A. Barry Rand, Diversity in Corporate America, in THE AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION DEBATE, supra note 8, at 65 (arguing that diversity is good for the Xerox
Corporation and for business generally).
10. Sixty-two leading research universities adopted a resolution proposed by
Harvard University supporting the right of admission offices to use ethnicity, race,
and gender to evaluate students. See Karen W. Arenson, 62 Top Colleges Endorse
Bias in Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1997, at A27.
11. See Yxta Maya Murray, Merit Teaching, 23 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1073
(1996) (using personal narratives and the concept of phronesis (experiential learning)
from Aristotelian moral philosophy to add meaning to "merit").
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Affirmative action in the context of the criminal justice
system, however, obliges us to ask different questions. For
example, can affirmative action accomplish drastic structural and
institutional change for those at the bottom of the economic and
social hierarchies? What are the limits of affirmative action
within the civil area and, perforce, within the criminal area?
What models of race and racism help us understand affirmative
action's limits and potentialities? Is the state's allocation of burdens logically analogous to the state's allocation of benefits, as
Professor Butler suggests? 12
In Part II of this response to Professor Butler, I analyze the
connection of affirmative action to two models of race and racism.
I contend that the Supreme Court Justices who continue to
support affirmative action adhere to a "prejudice" model in which
race is a concept to be overcome and racism is merely a condition
of individual ignorance. 13 On the other hand, I posit that
Professor Butler's proposals fall within a "white supremacy"
model, which looks at race as a historically contingent concept
that has been used to subordinate non-white peoples from precolonial times through the present. This historical perspective
offers the possibility that the concept of race can be given new
meaning to serve as the basis for positive individual and collective identities. Given this paradigmatic and ideological rift, there
is little common ground between Professor Butler and the
Supreme Court Justices.
In Part III, I analyze Professor Butler's six separate proposals to reform the criminal justice system. In doing so, I question
whether his proposals can be made to fit within conventional
affirmative action jurisprudence. I also highlight how implementation of these proposals, as currently framed, would require a
radical expansion of constitutional doctrine.
I conclude that his most controversial proposals, those that
advocate placing caps not only on the percentage of African
Americans who can be arrested and imprisoned for drug offenses,
but also on the percentage of African Americans who can be kept
12. See Butler, supra note 2, at 858-59 & nn.73-74.
13. I have entitled this article Of "Subtle Prejudices," White Supremacy, and
Affirmative Action to draw the connections between the two models of race and
racism and the public policy mechanisms called affirmative action. I have placed
Subtle Prejudices in quotation marks to link the first model of race and racism
analyzed with these specific words, this trope, taken from the narrative that
illustrates the model. See infra text accompanying notes 24-28.
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in prisons and jails, cannot be supported by current affirmative
action jurisprudence. Current case law permits only programs
that are narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental
purpose. 14 While diversity has been recognized as a governmental
interest in the context of higher education15 and radio licensing, 16
the only cognizable governmental interest within the criminal
context is the elimination of the effects of prior discrimination.
Unfortunately, establishing that particular criminal defendants
have been discriminated against is a formidable task indeed.
In Part IV, I take issue with Professor Butler's singular focus
on African American males and suggest that he, and other
scholars as well, adopt a cross-gendered and multicultural
approach to this type of race-based analysis. Historical racism
combined with the economic dynamics from which poverty results
are the criminogenic forces that lead disproportionately high
numbers of young people to criminal activity; 17 these forces affect
Latinos/as, other non-white populations, 18 and African Americans-albeit, in non-symmetrical ways. Relying on the work of
Tomas Almaguer, 19 I claim that discussions of race constructed

14. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding that
the federal set-aside program for rebuttably socially and economically disadvantaged
businesses must be reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard).
15. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that
the medical school's admission program, which reserved 16 seats for minority
students, was unconstitutional, but allowing the university to consider race as one
factor in constituting a diverse student body).
16. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S.
54 7 (1990) (holding that congressionally mandated FCC policies creating racial
preferences in the granting of radio licenses served the important governmental
interest of broadcast diversity and, in deference to Congress, would be reviewed
under an intermediate level of scrutiny), standard of review overruled by Adarand,
115 S. Ct. 2097.
17. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT 125-34 (1995).
[C]rime by young disadvantaged black men does not result primarily from
their individual moral failures but from their misfortune of being born in
places and times and under circumstances that make crime, drug use,
and gang membership look like reasonable choices from a narrow range
of not very attractive options.
Id. at 134. Tonry's analysis is limited by its almost exclusive focus on African
American males.
18. The statistics gathered by the federal agencies include American Indians,
Alaska Natives, Asians, and Pacific Islanders as one category. See, e.g., DARRELLK
GILLIARD & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT
MIDYEAR 1996, at 6 tbl. 7 (Jan. 1997).
19. ToMAs ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF
WHITE SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA (1994). Almaguer is an Associate Professor of
Sociology and American Culture at the University of Michigan.
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within a narrow black/white binary model re-create the very
distortions of history and reproduce the exclusion, subordination,
and silencing of "Other" -ized non-white groups that lie at the
heart of white supremacy. 20

IL

Two MODELS OF RACE AND RACISM

Paul Butler's paper raises fundamental questions about how
race and racism operate within criminal justice systems. In order
to analyze whether affirmative action jurisprudence can be used
to correct some of the more blatant racial inequities of the
criminal justice systems, it is necessary first to acknowledge that
there are competing conceptualizations of where racial power is
situated, how diverse groups are racialized within relationships
of power with the dominant majority, and how racial power
manifests, masks, and maintains itself. Two conceptualizations
of race and racism are especially relevant to Butler's argument:
the "prejudice" model21 and the "white supremacy'' model.
A.

The ''Prejudice" Model

Commentators writing about the criminal law and race have
consistently "assumed a model of race and racism within which
racial power is understood in terms of bias and discrimination." 22
This model of race and racism informed the civil rights reform
agenda of the Warren Court in the 1960s,23 and it continues to be
the paradigm that undergirds affirmative action programs.
Professor Peller describes this approach as "integrationist":

20. See, e.g., Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just
Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1995); see also George Martinez,
Mexican-Americans and Whiteness, 2 HARV. LAT. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
21. The prejudice model of racial power is related to the color-blind theory of
equal protection. See Suzanna Sherry, Selectiue Judicial Actiuism in the Equal
Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 47 GEO. L.J. 89 (1984);
see also ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992). But cf. Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
Catharine MacKinnon's gender-based analysis using a difference versus dominance
approach is analogous to the race-based models discussed herein. See CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
22. Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending
the Critical Tools of the Sixties, 67 TUI.. L. REV. 2231, 2233 (1993).
23. See id. at 2233-34.
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[T]he evil of racism was deemed to be its irrationality. Racism
was seen as a form of ignorance in that, while enlightened
people understood that race made no difference between
people, racists made malign assumptions about people based
on skin color.... When "stereotypes" were acted upon by
decisionmakers in the social world, bias assumed the form of
discrimination ....
. . . Enlightened people were colorblind in the sense that they
did not engage in pre-judice, in the judging of people based on
"stereotypes." . . . Once consciousness was cleansed of racial
bias, there would follow social consequences. Discrimination,
the social face of racism, would be replaced by equal treatment, and segregation, the systemic manifestation of discrimination, would be replaced by integration. 24

The following story illustrates the vocabulary and dynamics
of the prejudice model. Although situated in Scotland, the story's
legal details are analogous to the manner in which a similar case
might be tried in U.S. courts. Moreover, the notion of "subtle
prejudices" has similar, although not exact, resonances for whites
and non-whites in both British and U.S. public discourse.
On July 3-4, 1996, in Courtroom No. 11 of the High Court of
Edinburgh, Scotland, the case of H.R.M v. J.J. White was heard
by Judge J .F. Wheatley, Q.C., and a jury of seven men and seven
women. Jason White, a nineteen- or twenty-year-old black man,
was charged with assault and attempted robbery. He and a
friend had been playing games at an arcade and they had been
winning. When they began to think that they were not getting
fair payment, Jason went to talk with Mr. Taylor, the owner, to
ask for their money or for tokens. The request was rebuffed. As
they were about to leave the arcade, Jason returned to the small
office to talk to Mr. Taylor. A knife was produced (to whom the
knife belonged was never proven, although my recollection is that
the police had found the knife in Mr. Taylor's house when they
questioned him about the incident) and Jason's hand was cut.
Jason proceeded to the hospital where he told the doctor that he
had been cut in an altercation at an arcade. Because he was out
on bail from another incident, he went to see his solicitor rather
than the police, concluding they would not believe his version of
the story.
What follows is my paraphrasing (from notes that I took

24. Id. at 2245-46.
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while in the courtroom) of a part of the closing argument by the
solicitor representing Jason White: 25

Your Lordship. Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, allow me
to begi,n by talking about subtle prejudices. We all have bi.ases and
prejudices, and I don't want to offend you by suggesting that you
are different or worse than any of the rest of us. But we have to be
careful that we don't allow these subtle prejudices to affect how we
judge this matter.
The first subtle prejudice that I would like to point out is
youth versus age. Age is thought to bring decorum and wisdom.
The young are seen as inexperienced and self-involved. Mr.
Taylor's advanced age works to bolster his credibility while Jason
White's youth can create doubts about him. A second subtle
prejudice concerns idleness and unemployment versus the industry
shown by the owner of a family business. Jason testified that he
spent inordinate time at the arcade. This was not the first time
that he and his friend had gambled their money on the game
machines. Mr. Taylor told you how he had built up his business
and worked long hours at the arcade. A third subtle prejudice has
to do with involvement with the criminal justice system versus
law-abiding behavior. You are aware from the indictment that
Jason was out on bail when this incident occurred. He testified
that he distrusted the police. Mr. Taylor, on the other hand,
expecting to be believed by the police, called for them immediately
after Jason ran out of the arcade. ...
We are all fed up with the crime, noise, and squalor we associate with young people on the streets. But you are not on this jury
to get even with those who have pushed you off sidewalks. You are
not on this jury to do something about crime. You are on this jury
to decide whether the Crown has proven, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Jason White did what he is accused of doing.
Prejudice-subtle prejudices-can be the mood music in the
background that is unheard but that sets the tone for the discussions we have and the decisions we make. That is why judgi,ng is
hard. We ask you to be aware of your subtle prejudices and to set
them aside. That is why we trust you, common people not lawyers,
to decide the facts.

25. I regret that I do not know the name of the solicitor, so I cannot properly
acknowledge him.
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Scotland is not like other countries that imprison large
numbers of their citizens. I remind you, Scots, that you get the
quality of criminal justice that you, acting together as a jury, are
willing to mete out to persons like Jason White.
After deliberating for less than one hour, the jury returned a
verdict of not guilty. ·
Edinburgh is a city of about half a million people of which
fewer than one percent are black. 26 The chances of walking into
a courtroom and witnessing a trial of a black Scot are, thus, very
slim indeed. Yet, by chance and good fortune, I found myself
listening to a trial in which the solicitor placed race at the center
of the jury's attention-by never mentioning race. I am quite
sure that, when the solicitor began his exposition on "subtle
prejudices," others were as poised as I was to hear the juxtaposition of white with black; yet, cleverly, he never alluded to race or
color. He did not have to. Race was, in his words, the "mood
music" that was playing in the background of his argument. 27
The solicitor's closing argument embodies this view of racism
26. I am referring in this context to persons of African origin. I clarify this
designation because the British occasionally use the term black to describe all
persons of color whether Asian, East Indian, Pakistani, Latino/a, or African. Marie
Helene Laforest explains:
Already in the different terms used to name themselves today enormous
differences are evident between African Americans and Black British. In
Great Britain 'Black' has until very recently included all non-Europeans,
from South Americans (classified as Hispanics in the United States) to
West Indians and people from the Indian supcontinent (grouped with Far
Easterners in the United States). ['Black1 is therefore a term charged
with political valence ....
. . . With regard to race and ethnicity, the Black British purport their
position to be more open inasmuch as it is pluralist. Black British
intellectuals rightly argue that Blackness cannot be fixed and stable, that
identities are not continuous, traversed as they are by other events:
slavery then or the media today.
Marie Helene Laforest, Black Cultures in Difference, in THE POST-COLONIAL
QUESTION: COMMON SKIES, DMDED HORIZONS 115, 115-18 (lain Chambers & Lidia
Curti eds., 1996):
27. Sending nonverbal cues to the jury, as I contend this solicitor did so
successfully, can have different consequences in different settings. In his Jury
Nullification article, Professor Butler analyzes a case in which John T. Harvey, an
African American lawyer, represented a criminal defendant while wearing a stole
made of kente cloth, "a multihued woven fabric originally worn by ancient African
royalty, and [now] adopted ... as a symbol of racial pride." Butler, supra note 3, at
685. Attorney Harvey was prevented from wearing the kente stole during a jury trial
because, according to the white judge, he was "sending a hidden message to jurors."
Id.
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as prejudice. Implicit within this model is the notion that biases
and prejudices can be eliminated one person at a time. This
model of racism is individualistic in that correctives to racism are
focused on individual persons. In the case of the Jason White
story, individual jurors were called upon to resist acting on their
"subtle prejudices." I contend that the jurors were just as aware
of Jason White's race as was the solicitor and that he chose to
caution the jurors tacitly. His argument was effective in drawing
the connection between race and other "subtle prejudices" and
suggesting that all such prejudices are similar, without ever
mentioning race. 28

B. The "White Supremacy" Model
A second model, called the ideology of white supremacy, 29 is
fundamentally different in its conceptualization of race and
racism. Historians including George Fredrickson, 30 Winthrop
Jordon, 31 Ronald Takaki, 32 and, more recently, Tomas Almaguer33

28. Within the prejudice model, bias and discrimination can be experienced in
both subtle and overt ways. Racial markers, such as skin color or accents, are "read"
and responded to with varying degrees of antagonism. An extreme example of overt
individualized bigotry was the random murder of a black couple, Jackie Burden, 27,
and Michael James, 36, by James N. Burmeister, a private in the 82nd Airborne
Division at Fort Bragg. See Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent,
Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE
L.J. 1329, 1391-92 (1991) (asserting that accent resides in one of those "sacred places
of the self" and arguing for an extension of Title VII to prohibit accent
discrimination); see also Ex-G.I. at Fort Bragg Is Convicted in Killing of 2 Blacks,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1997, at A14.
29. The media has chosen to identify extremist groups such as the Aryan
Nation and the Ku Klux Klan with the term white supremacy. While such groups
do espouse an ideology based on racial superiority, it is equally true that,
historically, United States public policy has been based on similar beliefs, only such
beliefs have been masked in theological, philosophical, biological, and
anthropological rhetoric and discourse. For further discussion of this ideology in this
symposium, see Evelyn Hu-DeHart, Affirmative Action-Some Concluding Thoughts,
68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1209 (1997), and Sumi K. Cho, Multiple Consciousness and the
Diversity Dilemma, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1035 (1997).
30. See GEORGE FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN
AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY (1981).
31. See WINTHROP JORDON, WHITE OVER BLACK (reprinted 1969). Jordon traces
the naming practices of the English colonists, calling Negroes and Indians savages,
while calling themselves Christians:
In significant contrast, the colonists referred to Negroes and in the
eighteenth century to blacks and to Africans, but almost never to Negro
heathens or pagans or savages. Most suggestive of all, there seems to
have been something of a shift during the seventeenth century in the
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have developed this analysis, which traces the way that whites
have deployed racial differences, from pre-colonial times 34 to the
present, to justify the creation and maintenance of territorial, 35
spiritual, 36 moral, 37 labor,38 social, constitutional, and other group
hierarchies. These analyses emphasize the historical contingency
of race and ethnicity, terms that acquire meaning under specific
historical conditions, that occur within specific geographic spaces,
terminology Englishmen in the colonies applied to themselves. From the
initially most common term Christian, at mid-century there was a
marked drift toward English and free. After about 1680, taking the
colonies as a whole, a new term appeared-white.
Id. at 95.
32. See RONALD TAKAKI, IRON CAGES: RACE AND CULTURE IN NINETEENTH·
CENTURY AMERICA (1979).
33. See ALMAGUER, supra note 19.
34. Colonization in the Americas proceeded not only from New England
westward but also from Mexico into the Southwest. The racialization practices of
European colonists differed in their nature of the interactions with the indigenous
peoples. For example, the Spanish, unlike the English, arrived in the Americas
without women and took indigenous women as sexual partners, resulting in a
mestizo population. See CLAUDIO ESTEVA-FABREGAT, MESTIZAJE IN IBERO·AMERICA
(John Wheat trans., 1995).
35. Almaguer writes that, in the conflict with native peoples over the land they
occupied, white colonists relied on assumptions about differences that they had
brought with them from Europe. They saw themselves as Christians and civil, and
the indigenous peoples as heathens and savages. Such binary distinctions were later
used to racialize black populations and then "non-white" groups in the Southwest.
See ALMAGUER, supra note 19, at 20; see also Martinez, supra note 20 (arguing that
Mexican Americans were characterized in colonial discourses as non-white and were
denied the benefits associated with whiteness although courts legally construed them
as whites).
36. Fredrickson argues that while Europeans used both The Bible and classical
philosophers such as Aristotle to support their categorizations and poor treatment
of the diverse populations they encountered in the New World, these categories were
only later termed racist because of their explicit assumptions of genetic or biological
inferiority. See FREDRICKSON, supra note 30, at 7.
37. Almaguer writes:
All that was rational, civilized, and spiritually pure was set off from that
which was irrational, uncivilized, and tied to the body. Anglo-Saxon men
became civilized republican men of virtue, devoting their lives to hard
work, frugality, sobriety, and the mastery of both their passions and their
lives. The non-white, in contrast, became the foil for the lofty self-image
that white men accorded themselves. They were associated with qualities
such as filth or dirtiness, impurity, vice, intoxication, and the lascivious
indulgence of carnal "instincts."
ALMAGUER, supra note 19, at 22 (citing TAKAKI, supra note 32).
38. Almaguer explains that the racial segregation of labor markets and the
advantages of voluntary immigration benefited white Europeans. See id. Their
social and economic mobility was due to "the association of free labor with people of
white European stock and the association of unfree labor with non-Western people
of color." Id. at 24-25 (citing ROBERT BLAUNER, RACIAL OPPRESSION IN AMERICA
(1972)).
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and that affect different groups in various ways at different times.
Almaguer draws these conclusions:
Historically, differential access to valued social rewards ha[d]
shaped the course of ethnic and race relations in the United
States. Their unequal extension to white and non-white
groups via social closures led to divergent mobility routes and
different 'life chances' for these groups. Not every ethnic
population that entered into competition with whites equally
threatened their mobility aspirations, nor were they equally
granted access to important institutional spheres. It is here
that each group's collective attributes (such as their internal
class stratification, gender composition, population demographics, literacy rates, occupational skills, employment
background, physical differences from the white population,
collective association with precapitalist labor systems, and
explicit cultural factors such as values, religion, and ethnic
traditions) were critically important. This complex of factors
explicitly delineated these groups in racial terms and historically conditioned their mobility opportunities and potential
conflict with the white population. 39

In contrast to the prejudice model's focus on individualism,
the white supremacist model sees social, political, and economic
structures and institutions as the source of racial inequities.
Analyses based on ~hite supremacy focus on how group stigmatization and racial antagonisms affect and, at times, determine
arrangements and configurations throughout the society.
This ideology of white supremacy, constructed within the
black/white binary, has been acknowledged by the Supreme
Court. 40 Most recently, Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 41 observed that
[t]he United States suffers from those lingering effects [of
racial discrimination] because, for most of our Nation's
history, the idea that "we are just one race," was not embraced. For generations, our lawmakers and judges were
39. ALMAGUER, supra note 19, at 25.
40. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating state statutes
prohibiting interracial marriages). Chief Justice Warren stated that the Virginia
state court "[had] concluded that the State's legitimate purposes were 'to preserve
the racial integrity of its citizens,' and to prevent 'the corruption of blood,' 'a mongrel
breed of citizens,' and 'the obliteration of racial pride,' obviously an endorsement of
the doctrine of White Supremacy." Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
41. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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unprepared to say that there is in this land no superior race,
no race inferior to any other. In Plessy v. Ferguson, not only
did this Court endorse the oppressive practice of race segregation, but even Justice Harlan, the advocate of a "color-blind"
Constitution, stated:
''The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in
this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in
education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it·will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty."

Not until Loving v. Virginia, which held unconstitutional
Virginia's ban on inter-racial marriages, could one say with
security that the Constitution and this Court would abide no
measure "designed to maintain White Supremacy."42

C. Affirmative Action Fits Within the Prejudice Model
The Supreme Court Justices who still weakly defend affirmative action recognize a temporary need to allow public and private
entities to engage in race-based decisionmaking. However, as
Professor Peller explains, these conceptualizations of race as
irrational and of racism as similar to other prejudices that grow
out of ignorance combine so as to compel the Supreme Court
Justices to seek race-neutral alternatives and limit the use of race
in decisionmaking. 43 Moreover, since they are not looking to
expand the areas of social life they acknowledge as being affected
by race, such as the criminal justice system, they are not susceptible to racialized analyses and/or the need for race-sensitive
remedial action. Currently, the Supreme Court acts to minimize
the use of race in order to eventually eliminate it from all public
and private decisionmaking. 44

42. Id. at 2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
43. See Peller, supra note 22, at 2248 (''When race as a category is abstracted
from its social and historical context, race appears as an arbitrary, irrational factor
upon which to make social decisions. . . . Since it was the category of race that was
irrational, race consciousness was the evil, regardless of which way it ran.").
44. In Adarand, Justice O'Connor asserts, in explaining why even benign racial
classifications are impermissible: "Because that perception [that the beneficiaries
of preferences are perceived as less qualified]--especially when fostered by the
Congress of the United States-can only exacerbate rather than reduce racial
prejudice, it will delay the time when race will become a truly irrelevant, or at least
insignificant, factor." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (citations omitted) (quoting
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Affirmative action programs may, at one time, have had the
potential to challenge the ideology of white supremacy. For
example, the distinction between ''benign" and "invidious" uses of
race could have been retained and expanded by the Court. 45
Moreover, Justice Brennan's analysis in Metro Broadcasting46
could have been the basis for broader and more creative affirmative action programs to subvert racism and its institutional
manifestations and to create an alternative progressive ideology
based on a racialized cultural pluralism. The Court's emphatic
rejection of these analyses makes it difficult to envision the
United States' legal system coming to grips with its history in this
way.47
Recently, courts, state legislatures, and governors have acted
to completely prohibit the concept of benign racial classifications

Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 U.S. 2758 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
45. Justice Thurgood Marshall describes the difference between benign and
invidious uses of race:
A profound difference separates governmental actions that themselves
are racist, and governmental actions that seek to remedy the effects of
prior racism or to prevent neutral governmental activity from
perpetuating the effects of such racism. . . . Racial classifications 'drawn
on the presumption that one race is inferior to another or because they
put the weight of government behind racial hatred and separatism'
warrant the strictest judicial scrutiny because of the irrelevance of these
rationales. By contrast, racial classifications drawn for the purpose of
remedying the effects of discrimination that itself was race based have a
highly pertinent basis: the tragi~ and indelible fact that discrimination
against blacks and other racial minorities in this Nation has pervaded
our Nation's history and continues to scar our society.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 551-52 (1989) (citations omitted).
In Metro Broadcasting, Justice Brennan provided some historical context to the
notion of "benign" uses of race, recalling that nonremedial race-conscious measures
are as old as the Fourteenth Amendment. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547, 565 (1990). "For example, the Freedman's
Bureau Acts authorized the provision of land, education, medical care, and other
assistance to Afro-Americans." Id.
46. In Metro Broadcasting, Justice Brennan concluded that the FCC's minority
ownership policies, as mandated by Congress, were subject to an intermediate level
of scrutiny, a holding subsequently overturned by Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097. Justice
Brennan wrote for the majority that
Ll]ust as a "diverse student body" contributing to a "'robust exchange of
ideas"' is a "constitutionally permissible goal" on which a race-conscious
university admissions program may be predicated, the diversity of views
and information on the airwaves serves important First Amendment
values. The benefits of such diversity are not limited to the members of
minority groups who gain access to the broadcasting industry by virtue
of the ownership policies; rather, the benefits redound to all members of
the viewing and listening audience.
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547, 568 (1990) (citations omitted).
47. See Hu-DeHart, supra note 29.
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and other race-sensitive affirmative action mechanisms, thereby
stopping the process of racial integration before the entrenched
power groups were significantly affected. A historicized understanding of white supremacy suggests that civil affirmative action
is cunently under such broad attack precisely because it has been
effective in promoting institutional change. In finding an
"enduring aptness to the 'glass ceiling' metaphor," the bipartisan
Glass Ceiling Commission and other governmental agencies reach
similar conclusions:
[A]lthough white men constitute a minority of the total work
force (4 7%) and of the college educated work force (48%), they
dominate the top jobs in virtually every field. White males
comprise 91. 7% of officers and 88.1 % of directors. White men
hold over 90 percent of the top news media jobs. White men
constitute over 86 percent of partners in major law firms.
White men make up 85 percent of tenured college professors.
White men occupy over 80 percent of the management jobs in
advertising, marketing and public relations. The median
weekly earnings of white males in 1992 were 33 percent
higher than those of any other group in America. 48

The resultant institutional integration has occurred mostly
at mid-level jobs rather than at the highest ranks of managers,
partners, or public figures. Consequently, civil affirmative action
has been only a modest adjustment to race relations in this
society. As Professor Manning Marable has noted:
[A]ffirmative action can and should be criticized from the Left,
not because it was too liberal in its pursuit and implementation of measures to achieve equality, but because it was too
conservative. It sought to increase representative numbers of
minorities and women within the existing structure and
arrangements of power, rather than challenging or redefining
the institutions of authority and privilege. As implemented
under a series of presidential administrations, liberal and
conservative alike, affirmative action was always more
concerned with advancing remedies for unequal racial out-

48. 41 THE EMPLOYEE ADVOCATE, supra note 8, at 2·3 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FuLI.. USE OF THE NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL,
FACT-FINDING REPORT OF THE GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, BNA Supp. (Mar. 16,
1995) [hereinafter GLASS CEILING REPORT] and U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU
OF CENSUS, 1993 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S., at 393 tbl.622, 154 tbl.234).
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comes than with uprooting racism as a system of white
power. 49

D. Professor Butler's Proposals Fit Within the White
Supremacy Model
Professor Butler's implied meaning of "white supremacy" and
the one I utilize are conceptually distinct. When using the term
"white supremacy" in his earlier article as well as in this symposium issue, he limits it to the white majority's oppressive and
repressive relationship with the African American population,
dating back to the days of slavery. I favor a different meaning for
the same term, one that encompasses the white majority's
treatment of many groups of non-white peoples from pre-colonial
times to the present. Specifically, my meaning for the term
"white supremacy" adopts a broader temporal focus that begins
even before slavery, emphasizing a historical link between the
colonists' racialization of indigenous peoples-the English in the
Northeast and the Spanish in the Southwest-and, later, the
English colonists' racialization of peoples of African ancestry. My
use of the term encompasses the social mechanisms and the ideas
the white majority developed and used to subordinate different
non-white groups in varying ways and to different degrees not
only in the past, but today as well.
White supremacy is not a process that ended at some
nebulous point in the past. Instead, within my definition, current
racialization practices, including affirmative action programs, are
seen as fitting within a historical pattern of treatment of nonwhite groups. This definition affords a better understanding of:
(1) how affirmative action has been defined, applied, and limited
by the Supreme Court; (2) why affirmative action programs
exhibit contradictory and inconsistent effects, liberating some
subgroups while overlooking others within non-white communities; and (3) why affirmative action jurisprudence will not support
Professor Butler's proposal for a radical transformation of
criminal justice systems.

49. Marable, supra note 8, at 12; see also Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action
as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1222 (1991) (arguing that affirmative action and its related notion of rolemodeling are disempowering to people of color).
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Professor Butler's reliance on affirmative action jurisprudence as support for the constitutionality of his proposed reforms
is misplaced. His proposals are animated by an understanding of
racial power that is consistent with the white supremacist model,
one that explains racial inequities as the result of long-term
institutionalized racism as opposed to racism that targets
individuals within societal institutions.
Professor Butler asks us to imagine a future in which the
parameters of race-based programs are re-drawn and no longer
cabined by the current jurisprudence. 50 However, his proposals
are out of sync with even those Supreme Court Justices (with the
possible exception of Justice Ginsburg51) who continue to support
race-conscious decisionmaking because they subscribe to the
prejudice model.

Ill.

PROFESSOR BUTLER'S AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ANALYSIS

A.

Sp.ecific Observations

Professor Butler argues that an extension of affirmative
action propositions and rationales lays the legal foundation for
the constitutionality of his six reform proposals. 52 While Profes50. See Butler, supra note 2, at 844.
51. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
52. See Butler, supra note 2, at 874-76. Professor Butler particularizes his
affirmative action program by identifying the following proposals:
1. Retribution shall not justify punishment of any African American
criminal defendant.
2. Rehabilitation shall be the primary justification of punishment of
African Americans.
3. African American criminal defendants shall have the right to majority
black juries. If convicted, they shall have the right to be sentenced by
their majority black juries.
4. African Americans shall not be sentenced to death for interracial
homicide.
5. Effective immediately, African Americans shall be arrested for drug
offenses and sentenced to prison only in proportion to their involvement
in those crimes, that is, they shall comprise no more than twelve percent
of those arrested and twelve percent of those incarcerated. African
Americans whose arrest or incarceration increases the total proportion of
arrested or incarcerated blacks in excess of twelve percent shall be
released from custody.
6. Every jurisdiction in the United States shall maintain, by the year
2000, a prison population that accurately reflects the racial diversity of
the jurisdiction. The percentage of African Americans in prison shall not
exceed their proportion of the population of that jurisdiction by more than
two percent.
Id. at 877.
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sor Butler's last two proposals are surely the most controversial,
I will also briefly examine each of the first four proposals.
Although I disagree with several of Professor Butler's justifications for his proposals, 63 I agree with him that implementing
these four changes would bring greater justice, humanity, and
rationality to the criminal justice system. 64
What follows is a close reading of Professor Butler's specific
proposals. My purpose is twofold: first, to try to anticipate some
of the constitutional objections to the proposals and, second, to
suggest strategies for crafting Professor Butler's proposals so they
fall within conventional affirmative action doctrines.
1.

Proposals One and Two: Replacing Retribution
with Rehabilitation

Professor Butler explains that the premise for his first two
proposals, which would replace retribution with rehabilitation as
the justification for the punishment of African Americans, is the
past discrimination theory of affirmative action. 65 According to
Professor Butler, retribution is unjust because the disproportionate criminality of blacks is the result of slavery and segregation. 56
These proposals share two common aspects: one aspect
advocates attitudinal change within the criminal justice system,
and the other advocates the provision of special services. The
attitudinal portion of the proposal bears a resemblance to certain
components of voluntary affirmative action plans developed by
federal contractors in compliance with Executive Order 11,246.

53. I particularly disagree with Professor Butler's comparison of the process of
affirmative action to the "discomforting" "mechanics" of abortion. See id. at 845·46.
I personally find nothing discomforting about racial preferences and find the
comparison with abortion gratuitously provocative and un·illuminating. Moreover,
I consider reproductive rights as crucial for women's economic security and
occupational mobility as affirmative action.
54. I would not, however, restrict the changes to benefit only African
Americans.
55. See Butler, supra note 2, at 879.
56. See id. at 879·80.
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Such plans often include policies used by the employer to
facilitate the integration of people of color and white female
employees into the workforce. 57 At one time, such policies as
diversity training, antidiscrimination policies, and complaint
resolution procedures were innovative and somewhat controversial;58 today, they are used by both public and private employers,
who frequently include such policies in employee manuals. 59 It
has become unnecessary to provide any constitutional justification for such affirmative action mechanisms, which operate, to a
large extent, in a race-neutral manner.
Arguably, having people reject retribution in favor of
rehabilitation could be compared to diversity training programs
in that both seek to change people's behavior in the hopes of
changing their core attitudes and values as they pertain to race.
Seen in this light, these proposals could be designed so that no
racial preference is required for their implementation. For
instance, a program could be designed so that all employees in
criminal justice (guards, parole and probation officers, secretaries, maybe even lawyers and judges) would be required to
participate in training programs that address the benefits of
rehabilitation and the ignominy of retribution. 60
On the other hand, Professor Butler has articulated his first
two proposals so as to benefit only African Americans. This

57. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.44 (1996) (describing the required contents of
affirmative action plans under Exec. Order No. 11,246, Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1966, 3
C.F.R. 339 (1964-65), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1522-23 (1994)).
58. On January 18, 1997, I observed on a CSPAN television broadcast Speaker
of the House Newt Gingrich saying that he would support these types of practices in
response to the question of whether he supported affirmative action.
59. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23
HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921 (1996), in which the author sorts out what is and, by
extension, what is not included within the term affirmative action. He identifies the
five following race- and gender-conscious practices as "under the umbrella of
affirmative action: (1) quotas, (2) preferences, (3) self-studies, (4) outreach and
counseling, and (5) anti-discrimination." Id. at 926. The practices involving
attitudinal change on the part of correctional system employees correspond to
Professor Oppenheimer's fifth category of affirmative action programs, what he calls
antidiscrimination.
60. The general public's emphasis on the punishment of criminals and its
interest in retribution despite the concomitant recidivism is the subject of numerous
books. See, e.g., ALEXIS M. DURHAM III, CRISIS AND REFORM: CURRENT ISSUES IN
AMERICAN PUNISHMENT (1994); LoIS G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH (1994); HARM AND
CULPABILITY (AP. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996); PRINCIPLED SENTENCING
(Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING
MATTERS (1996).
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seems to indicate that his recommendation that "[r]ehabilitation
shall be the primary justification of punishment of African
Americans"61 could coexist alongside a regime whereby whites
and other non-white groups were imprisoned for retributive
reasons. As such, the more conservative members of the federal
bench would likely see these proposals as no different from the
types of racial preferences that they are determined to
eliminate. 62
Another aspect that Professor Butler's first two proposals
have in common is the provision of "job training, physical and
mental health care, and treatment of chemical dependencies."63
These proposals are most likely to pass constitutional muster if
they are likened to outreach and counseling programs in affirmative action plans targeting people of color and white women.
These latter affirmative action mechanisms have weak allocational consequences. In other words, these programs do not ensure
that beneficiaries will end up with jobs or services. Their purpose
is to diversify the pool of qualified persons being considered for
social benefits. Within such a design, prisoners would be
recruited and counseled about existing services that could be of
benefit to them once they are released. Nonetheless, even such
programs with weak affirmative action features would be
susceptible to constitutional challenge as impermissible preference programs, particularly in those jurisdictions that have
determined to eliminate all race-based programs. 64

61. Butler, supra note 2, at 877.
62. InAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118 (1995), Justice
Scalia made it clear that he would not agree to reparations or perhaps even a
leveling of the playing field for non-whites. He wrote:
In my view, government can never have a "compelling interest" in
discriminating on the basis of race in order to "make up" for past racial
discrimination in the opposite direction .... Individuals who have been
wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; but
under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or
a debtor race.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Butler, supra note 2, at 880.
64. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Impact of the Proposed California Civil Rights
Initiative, 23 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 999, 1005-06 (1995) (warning that the California
Civil Rights Initiative would allow even these types of programs with minimal
allocational effects to be challenged as race-based).
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Proposal Three: Majority Black Juries

Professor Butler's third proposal would require majority
black juries and would reallocate the functions of the judge and
the jury by allowing the latter to sentence the defendant. 66
Professor Butler offers two rationales for this proposal: the
elimination of ongoing discrimination and "essential-diversity,
voting rights rhetoric (particularly as it concerns maximization of
the minority voice)."66 With respect to the first rationale, the
Supreme Court has not been persuaded by recent arguments that
prosecutors are behaving in discriminatory ways in the constitution of juries.67
The current law on the racial composition of juries and the
related issue of the use of preemptory challenges to potential
jurors creates a significant obstacle for Professor Butler's
suggested changes. The Sixth Amendment provision guaranteeing a "jury of one's peers" has not been interpreted by the federal
courts to require a jury that mirrors the defendant's race. The
Court requires only that the jury be drawn from "a cross-section
of the community"68 and does not require that the jury "contain
representatives from every group in the community,"69 much less
even contemplate using race as the defining characteristic of the
jury. Although a defendant has a right to jury selection procedures that are fair and nondiscriminatory, "a defendant has no
65. Perhaps the legal justifications that have been formulated for all-male black
schools would also support majority black juries. See, e.g., Kevin Brown, After the
Desegregation Era: The Legal Dilemma Posed by Race and Education, 37 ST. Loms
U. L.J. 897, 900 (1993) (explicating the legal and cultural contradictions in proposing
solutions to the education of African Americans); Pamela J. Smith, All Male Black
Schools and the Equal Protection Clause: A Step Forward Toward Education, 66
TUI,. L. REV. 2003 (1992) (arguing that the resegregation of schools is necessary to
remedy past educational discrimination against African American boys).
66. Butler, supra note 2, at 880-81. In proffering "essential-diversity'' or
"maximization of the minority voice" as a second rationale for this proposal, Professor
Butler references racial redistricting. See id. at 881. An important difference
between racial redistricting and jury selection is that all persons end up in a voting
district, while some persons are excluded from jury service. However, I am unable
to find a doctrinal connection between the democratic concerns that underlie the
voting rights cases and this proposal for majority black juries. See Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630 (1993).
67. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362 (1991) (accepting the
prosecutor's explanation that striking potential jurors for their Spanish language
ability was not race- or national origin-based).
68. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
69. Id.
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right to a 'petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his
own race."' 70 Recently, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 71 the
Supreme Court expanded the Batson ruling72 to prohibit genderbased challenges. However, even this case offers little support for
Professor Butler's proposal because prosecutors can continue to
use preemptory challenges to strike black women from death
penalty cases if the black women are reluctant to impose this
punishment. 73 Even this clearly discriminatory practice has not
been frowned upon by the federal courts. Short of the Supreme
Court overruling these precedents, I fail to see how Professor
Butler's proposal could be implemented.
3.

Proposal Four: Eliminating the Death Penalty for
Interracial Homicides

Professor Butler's fourth proposal would prohibit imposition
of the death penalty for interracial homicides. Application of the
Court's "death is different" paradigm could allow for implementation of this proposal, 74 but it is unlikely given the pro-death
climate in the general population and among lawmakers.
Nonetheless, another alternative may be available: Congress,
even after Adarand, 75 may yet have the power under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment76 to enact race-conscious legislation of the type recommended by Professor Butler. Several
precedential cases support this assertion. For example, in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 77 the Court stated that "Section 5 is a
positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to

70. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994) (Blackmun, J.)
(quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880)).
71. Id.

72. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibiting the use of
preemptory challenges to eliminate potential jurors on the basis of their race).
73. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (holding that the Constitution
does not prohibit the removal of jurors whose opposition to the death penalty
prevents them from considering it as a possible sentence).
74. See Butler, supra note 2, at 883-84.
75. In Adarand, Justice O'Connor clarifies that "we need not decide today
whether the program upheld in Fullilove [v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980),] would
survive strict scrutiny as our more recent cases have defined it." Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995).
76. Section Five is called the enforcement clause and reads as follows: ''The
Congress shall have the power to enforce,. by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5.
77. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).

1997]

SUBTLE PREJUDICES

913

exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."78 Furthermore, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 79 the Court
described the unique remedial powers given to Congress by
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment in the following
manner:
Here we deal ... not with the limited remedial powers of a
federal court, but with the broad remedial powers of Congress.
It is fundamental that in no organ of government, state or
federal, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial
power than in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with competence and authority to enforce equal
protection guarantees. 80

In the lead opinion inAdarand, Justice O'Connor noted that
the various Justices have differing views on the nature of the
authority delegated to Congress by Section Five and the extent to
which the Courts must defer to Congress in its exercise of this
authority, but acknowledged that these remain unanswered
questions. 81 Section Five may represent the best constitutional
foundation for challenging the manner in which the application
of the death penalty is skewed in state courts by racial considerations, given that the fundamental purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment is "to secure ... equal protection of the laws against
State denial or invasion"82 and that the states, not the federal
government, are largely responsible for the administration of the
death penalty.
In order to establish the necessary factual record to support
Section Five action on Professor Butler's death penalty proposal,
the Congress could hold hearings to make extensive and specific
78. Id. at 651. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (holding the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional), the Supreme Court, in defining
the limits of congressional enforcement power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, emphasized that the nature of the power is remedial rather than
substantive, that is, that the power is limited to measures that remedy or prevent
unconstitutional actions.
79. 448 U.S. at 448.
80. Id. at 483.
81. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2114 (1995).
Justice Souter, in dissent, opined that Section Five is ''the source of an interest of the
national government sufficiently important to satisfy the corresponding requirement
of the strict scrutiny test." Id. at 2133.
82. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879).
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findings about the strong correlation between the imposition of
the death penalty and its imposition in cases with non-white
defendants and white victims. 83 If the Congress were then to
craft a remedial statute that was narrowly tailored to address the
identified injustice, the statute might pass constitutional muster.
4.

Proposals Five and Six: Capping the Number of
African American Prisoners

Professor Butler's fifth and sixth proposals entail the most
inflexible use of race-based decisionmaking because they advocate
the establishment of caps on the number of African Americans
arrested and punished for drug offenses and the number of
African Americans incarcerated generally. These proposals turn
conventional affl.l'mative action on its head in two respects: fll'st,
by using race not as a justification for the inclusion of minority
members, but as a justification for their exclusion from government-sponsored programs, such as prisons; and second, by using
race not as a plus among many other criteria, 84 but as the sole
and dispositive criterion for releasing prisoners. Professor Butler
asserts that either the legal justification of combating ongoing
discrimination or "parity-diversity'' would be the premise for
these proposals.85 He argues that imprisoning far fewer African
Americans would lower the overall total of persons imprisoned
because the "punishment of African Americans would be 'leveled
down' as opposed to the punishment of whites being 'leveled
up."' 86 This would result in a substantial decrease in the money
now spent to support prisons as well as "a net increase in public
safety."87

83. The Congress, unlike other administrative and judicial bodies, may legislate
without compiling a factual record and can take account of the "abundant historical
basis ... which ... could perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination." Fullilove,
448 U.S. at 449-50.
84. See Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLAL. REV. 1781 (1996). "[T]he term
'credit' has been loosely interchangeable with the terms 'plus-factor,' 'plus,' or, most
generically, 'preference.' ... By credits, I mean a preference that forces minorities to
compete with whites for government benefits, but gives minorities an advantage over
similarly situated whites." Id. at 1800-01.
85. See Butler, supra note 2, at 853 (explaining "parity-diversity" as
"measur[ing] the fairness of resource allocation by its racial effect'').
86. Id. at 887.
87. Id. at 888.
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I am of two minds about Professor Butler's "radical"88
proposals (as I am about the more general aspects of this reform
project). As I state later, I fear that proposing changes that have
no possibility of being implemented under the current political
regime diverts us from the more difficult work of designing
remedial programs that are palatable to those in power and that
stand a chance of improving the material conditions of communities of color. 89 At the same time, I completely agree that the drug
laws and their consequences are irrational, draconian, and
indefensible, and must be challenged as contrary to the interests
of both the white majority and communities of color. 90
Several unanswered questions may determine the salience of
the various justifications that Professor Butler proffers.
5.

What Legal Entity Would Implement the
Proposals: The President, Congress, States, or
Municipalities?

Professor Butler's six race-based proposals for transforming
the criminal justice system could be implemented through various
means. They could be instituted via presidential action, such as
an executive order along the lines of the aforementioned Executive Order 11,246;91 congressional action, such as the FCC

88. Professor Butler tells us that he proudly accepts the description "radical",
''because it suggests the degree of [his] discomfort with the status quo." Butler,
supra note 3, at 689 n.67.
89. See infra Part III.B.
90. See Butler, supra note 2, at 864 & n.91. "African Americans comprise
thirteen percent of drug consumers, a figure roughly equivalent to their percentage
of the population. Yet thirty-three percent of all people arrested for drug use and
seventy-four percent of all people incarcerated for drug use are African Americans."
Id. at 864
91. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965); see Michael H. LeRoy,
Presidential Regulation of Private Employment: Constitutionality of Executive Order
12,954 Debarment of Contractors Who Hire Permanent Striker Replacements, 37 B.C.
L. REV. 229, 297 (1996) (expressing the opinion that, after Adarand, the courts are
increasingly likely to review the President's use of federal contracts for other social
and economic goals). Executive orders issued by the President raise a difficult
separation of powers question: "Whether the contemporary President and Congress
share lawmaking powers, or whether the President's powers are confined to those
expressly enumerated in Article II." Id. at 231. Such orders have been an important
source of executive authority and have been used frequently to resolve labor
disputes, to regulate wages and hours, and to address the problem of racial
discrimination in federal employment. See id. at 236. In 1941, President Roosevelt
issued Executive Order 8802 ending racial and religious discrimination in defense
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preferences at issue in Metro Broadcasting; 92 or judicial approval
of a consent decree93 or entry of the court's own order. 94
Adarand revealed that the standard of review for any equal
protection challenge to, or appeal of, any one of these race-based
initiatives will be strict scrutiny regardless of the nature (federal,
state, or private) of the initiating entity. 96 Conceivably, a court
that has made findings of discrimination will have greater leeway
in fashioning a race-based remedy, but the scope of the remedy
will be limited to the nature of the violation and limited to the
identified victims. 96 Adarand leaves open the question of whether
a congressional enactment would withstand constitutional
challenge although it might if it, too, were enacted under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 97 If it were an executive
branch initiative, it would likely face greater resistance than a
congressional initiative would because the executive lacks
enforcement powers expressly granted to the Congress under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 98 Thus, the Supreme
Court would probably refuse to defer to the race-based policies
formulated by the executive branch; therefore, in all likelihood,
the Court would subject an executive order to the same strict
scrutiny applied to congressional enactments. 99
However, the appropriate inquiry does not end with agreement regarding the correct standard of review to be applied to
Butler's proposals. This is because the identity of the legal actor
initiating Professor Butler's proposals would determine which
affirmative action cases the Court would rely upon as precedent

employment. See id. at 252-53. Subsequent presidents used executive orders to
expand the prohibitions against discrimination, to create employment opportunities,
and to enact affirmative action programs. See id. at 252-61. Only one executive
order has been successfully challenged in the courts. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
92. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547
(1990).
93. See, e.g., Local 93, International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,
478 U.S. 501 (1986) (approving a consent decree creating an affirmative action
promotion plan for blacks and Hispanics).
94. See, e.g., U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (affirming lower court's order
requiring the Alabama state troopers to promote one black trooper for every white
trooper promoted).
95. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995).
96. See Paradise, 480 U.S. 149.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 75-83.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 75-83.
99. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
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for its analysis. In other words, precedential cases would vary
depending on whether the initiating agency is a federal entity or
a state or local municipality. For example, if the executive branch
or Congress were to implement Professor Butler's proposals and
the statute were then challenged, the equal protection analysis
would involve the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause (a
Fullilove/ Metro Broadcasting I Adarand issue). If the states or a
local municipality were to implement Professor Butler's proposals, the equal protection analysis would involve the Fourteenth
Amendment (a Croson-type issue). My point is that Professor
Butler has not clarified which governmental entity might
implement his proposals, and the various choices can increase the
likelihood of these proposals having some viability or being
immediately moribund.
6.

Are Professor Butler's Proposals Preferences or
Quotas?

Although Professor Butler defines affirmative action in terms
of "preferences," his fifth and sixth recommendations 100 seem to
be quotas, not preferences. These proposals define a maximum
level of participation by a racial group and direct governmental
entities to develop programs to implement these numerical rates
of incarceration. 101
Succinctly stated, I know of no legal precedent that would
allow quota programs to be implemented by any type of entity,
public or private, federal or state, congressional or executive. 102

100. To paraphrase, his recommendations are that (1) African Americans be
arrested and incarcerated for drug crimes at a percentage equal to their percentage
of the total population; (2) they be released from custody until no more than 12% of
all inmates are African American; and (3) prison populations reflect the population
of the jurisdiction. See Butler, supra note 2, at 877.
101. See generally Ayres, supra note 84 (asserting that the analysis
differentiates between quotas and credits, either of which can be rule· or standardbased).
102. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Justice
O'Connor, in the lead opinion, states that
the city's only interest in maintaining a quota system rather than
investigating the need for remedial action in particular cases would seem
to be simple administrative convenience. But the interest in avoiding the
bureaucratic effort necessary to tailor remedial relief to those who truly
have suffered the effects of prior discrimination cannot justify a rigid line
drawn on the basis of a suspect classification.
Id. at 508.
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As Professor Oppenheimer notes: "We may argue the merits of
affirmative action quotas, but the Court has foreclosed any
further experiments with such plans. They are a dead letter." 103
Moreover, it is equally unlikely that, even after making specific
findings of discrimination, the federal courts could craft a remedy
sufficiently broad in scope so as to implement these proposals. In
other words, litigation would have to proceed prison by prison,
alleging and proving discrimination by individuals. ·Only then
could the courts fashion orders releasing convicted prisoners.
If these two proposals are read as involving targets or
goals, 104 they still face several constitutional hurdles. Suffice it
to say that any entity developing and implementing race-based
proposals that entail releasing African Americans from prison
would have to overcome strict scrutiny. Under this two-prong
test, the entity would have to demonstrate that Professor Butler's
proposed racial preferences were narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest, and that no alternative raceneutral means for accomplishing racial equity in criminal law
existed. 106 In all likelihood, this constitutional standard would
bar implementation of these proposals.
7.

How Would Strict Scrutiny Be Applied to
Professor Butler's Proposals?

Professor Butler offers a diversity rationale as a justification
for affirmative action or race-based preferences and offers two
alternative definitions of diversity: "essential diversity," which
uses race as a proxy for perspective, and "parity-diversity," which
"measures the fairness of resource allocation by its racial
effect." 106 Professor Butler sees this second definition as "more
persuasive" than the first. 107 While I agree that it may be
persuasive, courts do not share this sentiment. The Supreme
Court has rejected allocational schemes, such as Professor

103. Oppenheimer, supra note 59, at 926.
104. The proposals, if viewed as targets or goals, would be similar to the goals
and timetables generated by federal contractors after they conduct utilization/availability studies, pursuant to Executive Order 11,246. See Exec. Order No.
11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, n
(1994).
105. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995).
106. Butler, supra note 2, at 852, 853.
107. Id. at 853.
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Butler's proposals, that are based on population profiles. 108 But
let us assume that an argument can be made against this
prerequisite that race-neutral mechanisms be exhausted. There
are still formidable narrow tailoring requirements that Professor
Butler has not addressed. The case law articulates clear standards for constitutionally permissible race-based preferences:
First, the plan must be flexible, eschewing strict quotas in
favor of fluid and amendable goals and timetables ... , rather
than mere by-the-numbers decisionmaking. Second, the plan
must be temporary, continuing only as long as necessary to
correct the problem it addresses. Third, the plan must not
interfere with the legitimate settled expectations of incumbent
majority members .... 109

Professor Butler must provide more specifics about how the
prison release would be implemented-that is, how ·flexible goals
would be determined by each jurisdiction, the duration of each
program, and how the rights of white victims or inmates are not
adversely affected by this plan-before his proposals could be
seriously considered.

B. General Observations
I am frankly of two minds about Professor Butler's proposals.
I agree with much of his underlying analysis of the inequities of
the criminal justice system: people of color are more involved in
criminal activity because of the squalor of their living conditions
and lack of training or job possibilities. 110 Thus, they are arrested, imprisoned, and sentenced to death in numbers that are
greatly disproportional to their representation in the total
population, 111 and communities of color are seriously weakened

108. In City of Richmond u. JA Croson Co., Justice O'Connor could find no goal
to support the 30% set-aside, except perhaps "outright racial balancing," which she
considers so out-of-the-question that she does not even analyze it. 488 U.S. at 507.
Instead she dismisses it without comment. See id. at 507.
109. Oppenheimer, supra note 59, at 935 (citation omitted).
110. See Butler, supra note 2, at 860-62; see also WIWAM JULIUS WII.80N, THE
DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 23 (1978) (positing that the elimination of racial
discrimination is necessary but not sufficient to secure economic integration for
African Americans).
111. See Butler, supra note 2, at 865-66.
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because of this cycling of people in and out of prisons. 112 I also
agree that race (and racism) play a significant role in the
operation and implementation of the criminal law, 113 including
the use of the death penalty. 114 I agree that race-conscious
measures are necessary to correct many of these abuses.
However, I do not agree that affirmative action can be the legal
architecture with which to rebuild the criminal justice system.
Thus, Professor Butler and I differ in the means we would employ
to accomplish our agreed-upon objective of radically changing the
criminal justice system. 115
I am, however, of two minds about Professor Butler's
proposals for another reason-a substantive reason grounded in
power, politics, and the role of theorists of color in promoting
social change advantageous to communities of color. Specifically,
I wonder whether trying to attach the massive inequities of the
criminal law to the weak foundation of civil affirmative action
makes political sense. Are Professor Butler's proposals so
unconventional as to distract us from focusing on theories that
are more likely to lead to positive changes for communities of
color? At first blush, I think many, especially whites, would
dismiss his proposals. Upon reflection, however, we are forced to
ponder why this society, whose history is interwoven with racism,
resists developing race-sensitive solutions to clearly race-linked
problems. If affirmative action jurisprudence, as currently
articulated by the courts, is not appropriate, then what alternative race-conscious legal mechanisms can we even imagine and
then formulate for correcting the race-based inequities of the
criminal justice systems?
Professor Butler's thesis evokes programs that are premised
on a historical, retrospective view of race, a view that acknowledges race as a conceptual outgrowth of white supremacy.
112. See id. at 864 n.88 (citing an article that argues that minority communities
are better off with more law enforcement and Butler's own article that rebuts this
argument).
113. See id. at 864-66 (arguing that race is already a consideration in the
administration of justice, as exemplified by police uses of racial profiles, the racial
segregation of prisons for reasons of security or discipline, or minority preferences
in the hiring of prison guards).
114. See id. at 882-83.
115. The televised criminal trial ofO.J. Simpson in the Fall of 1995 convinced
many people, for varying reasons, that changes should be made in the administration
of criminal justice. I consider the matter to be sui generis because of the wealth and
celebrity of the defendant and the excessive media attention.
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Professor Butler's thesis also suggests a historicized, prospective
view of race, a view of race as a concept with the potential to
dismantle racial hierarchies, constitute positive individual and
collective identities, and promote social cohesion.
Those of us who are proponents of affirmative action have
defended it from attacks, both theoretical and political. Civil
affirmative action, as weak as it has been in addressing structural and institutional arrangements, is all we have had.
Perhaps the primary virtue of Professor Butler's article is its
clamor for more ambitious, more subversive theories and
programs of change.
Although Professor Butler's proposals to release convicted
felons cannot meet constitutional requirements, the criminal
justice system is ripe for the enactment of a wide range of other
reforms. Unfortunately, Congress and the President have
recently passed up opportunities to implement such changes. For
example, in 1995, the President refused the recommendations of
the United States Sentencing Commission to equalize the
penalties for possession of crack and powder cocaine. 116 Similarly,
Congress twice failed to pass the Racial Justice Act. 117 Nonetheless, impr9vements, such as the equalization of sentences for
similar drug-related crimes committed by whites and non-whites,
are urgently needed to insure racial justice in the administration
of criminal law.
One additional reality dooms Professor Butlers proposals,
especially those that require a determination of the inmate's race.
If racial identities are socially constructed rather than biologically

116. See President's Statement on Signing S. 1254 (Oct. 30, 1995), available in
1995 WL 634347, at *l.
117. H.R. 4092, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. Title IX (1994), reprinted in 140 CONG.
REC. H2655-56 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1994). In 1994 the House of Representatives
approved the Racial Justice Act, but it was later dropped from the Crime Bill in
conference with the Senate. A 1990 version had met with the same fate. The Act
would have permitted defendants to present data raising an inference that the death
sentence was imposed with a racial motivation. The Act also specified the process
by which the government could rebut the inference. If it was unable to do so, the Act
prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. See Symposium, Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994: The Racial Justice Act, 20 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 557, 653 (1995). See generally Don Edwards & John Conyers, Jr., The Racial
Justice Act-A Simple Matter of Justice, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 699 (1995); Daniel E.
Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, The Racial Justice Act of 1994-Undermining
Enforcement of the Death Penalty Without Promoting Racial Justice, 20 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 655 (1995).
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fixed, 118 then the possibility of bogus or newly adopted racial
identities must be addressed. During the height of segregation,
courts routinely determined the racial identities of litigants; more
recently, courts have moved away from involving the govern:tnent
in determining the race of a particular person. 119
Under Professor Butler's proposals, it would be very favorable for prison inmates to self-identify or to be determined to be
African American. As such, attempts at falsifying racial identities or claiming an African American identity based on an
attenuated blood line would likely follow. This, in turn, could
necessitate government enactment of pernicious rules, similar to
the "one drop" rule, 120 to determine racial identities: 121
118. See IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE xiv (1996) ("'White' does not denote a rigidly defined, congeneric grouping of
indistinguishable individuals. It refers to an unstable category which gains its
meaning only through social relations and that encompasses a profoundly diverse set
of persons."); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Bordered Identities: Narrative and the
Social Construction of Legal and Personal Identities, in CROSSING BOUNDARIES:
TRADITIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY RESEARCH (Austin Sarat et
al. eds., forthcoming 1998).
119. See Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits
of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263 (1995). Professor Karst
explains:
In the field ofrace relations much remains to be done to make good on the
constitutional promise of equal citizenship. Yet it does seem that the
nation has turned a corner in one respect: Government largely leaves it
to individuals to define-the sociologists would say, negotiate-their own
racial identities. The census form asks for racial self-identification, and
the government ordinarily does not second-guess individual responses.
The form is designed, not to police the boundaries of racial identities, but
to permit the sorting of personal data into demographic categories.
Surely the policy of self-definition is a healthy one.
Id. at 328.
120. See F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK?: ONE NATION'S DEFINITION (1991).
121. In Fullilove, Justice Stevens articulated a serious concern about defining
the race of individual citizens:
[T)he very attempt to define with precision a beneficiary's qualifying
racial characteristics is repugnant to our constitutional ideals. . . . If the
National Government is to make a serious effort to define racial classes
by criteria that can be administered objectively, it must study precedents
such as the First Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship Law of November
14, 1935 ....
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 n.5 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). One
commentator notes that Justice Stevens' expressed concern is
ultimately not persuasive. Racial classifications need not turn on the
arcane measures of consanguinity used in the Nuremberg laws, South
Africa's Apartheid or our own Jim Crow regimes. . . . Defining an
individual's race by making inferences (or possibly requiring evidence)
about whether she was exposed to disparate treatment should not raise
the same constitutional concerns.
Ayres, supra note 84, at 1798-99 (citations omitted).
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Professor Butler's proposals raise a gender-based concern as
well. Women of all races are currently incarcerated at rates far
below their proportional representation in the total population. 122
Does Professor Butler propose to increase the numbers of women
who are incarcerated in order to have the prison population
match the demographic profile of the general population? He
answers in a footnote:
[S]hould women be proportionately incarcerated, that is,
should women comprise 50% of those in prison? Once again
the answer might depend upon the reason for the disparity.
Is it possible that men are more dangerous or immoral, for
reasons that are deserving of punishment? ... I would punish
men even if the gender disparity in their criminality stems
from biology. 123

Thus, Professor Butler fails to conclusively analyze the issue of
gender proportionality. If his proposals do implicate an increase
in the imprisonment of women, what principled reason could be
offered to convince African American women to accept an
increased burden of arrest and incarceration?
For the foregoing reasons, I disagree with Professor Butler's
assertion that current civil affirmative action jurisprudence
would create a legal foundation upon which to establish his
criminal law proposals. Regardless of my conclusion that
Professor Butler's proposals ultimately might lead to a more just
society, the Supreme Court opinions that birthed the concept of
affirmative action are not sufficiently elastic to embrace these
reforms.
IV.

COMPLEXITIES OF RACIALIZED PERSPECTIVES

Professor Butler's article tentatively explores the possibility
for reconciliation around issues of race and uses the concept of
affirmative action to examine the outer edges of this society's
commitments to equality and inclusion. In this section I critique
Professor Butler for not heeding his own call for an expansive

122. White women comprise more than half of the population but only comprise
seven percent (or 7657 women) of the federal prison population. See ·BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS·1995, at 563 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L; Pastore eds., 1996).
123. Butler, supra note 2, at 887 n.172.
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application of race-based solutions to the inequities of the
criminal justice system. Specifically, I chide Professor Butler for
two reasons: first, for using the concept of race as virtually coextensive with the African American experience, and second,' for
accepting, without problematizing, the conservative opinion that
race is an inaccurate proxy for group perspectives. Finally, I
credit Professor Butler for surfacing some of the inconsistencies
in civil affirmative action when refracted through the lens of the
inequities of the criminal justice system.
A.

Distortions of Black/White Binary Analyses

Professor Butler explains that he focuses "on African
Americans because of their extreme participation in the criminal
justice system compared with other groups." 124 I believe his
statement reveals a weakness in his understanding of the power
of wh::.te supremacy.
Professor Butler's claim that African American criminality is
rooted in "the disease of white supremacy''125 oddly disregards the
comparable reality of Latino/a economic deprivation and disproportionate incarceration rates. On January 30, 1997, the New
York Times carried a front page, top of the fold, article with the
following headline: "Hispanic Households Struggle Amid Broad
Decline in Income."126 This article included a graph showing that
while the family income of whites increased by 2.2%, and that of
African Americans by 9.9% in the period from 1992-1996, the
family income of Hispanics, whether American-born or newly
arrived, fell by 6.9%. 127 These economic statistics have their
unfortunate corollaries in Latino imprisonment rates: the states
with the four largest prison populations, California, Texas, New
York, and Florida, all have substantial Latino/a populations.
Approximately one-third of the prison populations of California
and New York are Latino/a, although the percentages of Latinos/as in the general population are twenty-seven percent and
thirteen percent, respectively. 128
124. Id. at 857 n.71.
125. Id. at 862.
126. Carey Goldberg, Hispanic Households Struggle Amid Broad Decline in
Income, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at Al.
127. See id.
128. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 122, at 563. These
statistics do not disaggregate inmates by drug offenses.
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I am not trying to make a dash for the bottom on behalf of
Latinos/as, 129 nor am I taking issue with the fact that African
Americans are unconscionably overrepresented in prisons.
Instead, I am making a somewhat different point: Race relations
in this country are extremely complex. White supremacy is
experienced by non-white groups in different ways in different
geographic regions under different historical conditions. Professor Almaguer provides a particularly cogent analysis of this
complexity. Because the scholarly understanding of "race" has
developed in the shadow of the black/white encounter, academics
have typically focused on national racial demographics and have
overlooked racial dynamics in the American Southwest. 130 He
identifies three consequences of this academic oversimplification:
(1) [W]e tend to see 'race relations' as a binary and bipolar
relationship, a perspective that offers little understanding of
what happens when more than two racialized groups are
competing; (2) we ofte_n view race and class hierarchies as
neatly corresponding or symmetrical, as in the prototypical
slaveowner/slave relationship; and (3) we generally assume
that racializing discourses and practices are derived from or
mask other, more fundamental underlying structures such as
the class relationship between capital and labor. 181

Thus, I posit that a multi-racial and cross-gendered analysis
129. Professor Almaguer explains how the relative position of different groups
shifts over time:
[T]he social character of "race" and the racialization of Mexicans in
California . . . speak to ways in which race is fundamentally a
sociohistorical category that is historically contingent. Although I have
argued that nineteenth-century Mexicans occupied an "intermediate"
group position in the racial hierarchy that white supremacy structured
· at that historical moment, this century has witnessed the reconfiguration
of these racial fault lines. What is perhaps most obvious to me today is
the reassignment of Mexicans-especially the undocumented, nonEnglish-speaking population-to the bottom end of the new racial and
ethnic hierarchy. They are part of the contemporary subaltern class of
non-citizen Latino and Asian workers still bound by exploitative labor
relations which harken back to the nineteenth century.
ALMAGUER, supra note 19, at 212; see also DAVID MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND
MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836-1986 (1987) (providing a sociological and
historical account of the conflict and accommodation that characterized the border
region of Texas, including detailed descriptions of the organization of labor markets
divided by race; the territorial displacements of Mexicans; the legal segregation of
housing, employment, and education; and the struggle for political and social
inclusion).
130. See ALMAGUER, supra note 19, at 2.
131. Id.
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would reveal structures of subordination within the context of the
criminal justice system more accurately than Professor Butler's
binary racial construct. Moreover, such an analysis is more
consistent with the historicity of "race" and provides a vocabulary
that moves us beyond the blacldwhite model that characterizes
much of what is written about racial groups. 132

B. Practices of Universalizing Racialized Perspectives
Professor Butler acknowledges "some sympathy with the
traditional critique of diversity'' 133 (presumably that it stereotypes
African Americans as having collective and universalized
perspectives) 134 and states that "[r]ace is a troubling and usually
inaccurate proxy for perspective." 135 Yet, both of his articles
proceed on the assumption that race tells us something important
about how African Americans as a group view the world and how
they act in it. African Americans are presumed by Professor
Butler to possess some common perspectives about the criminal
law, race, and justice. I fail to understand why the use of race as
a proxy is troubling for Professor Butler in the context of affirmative action and, specifically, as a means of achieving some
diversity within institutions of higher education136 or within the
broadcasting industry, 137 but less troubling with respect to juries
or the collective perception within the black community about the
urgency of dismantling the criminal justice system. Why is
Professor Butler troubled by others who assume that African
Americans share perspectives in the context of affirmative action?
Why is he troubled by others who universalize racial perspectives,

132. Two works that I have drawn on for this article are good examples of works
that focus almost exclusively on the African American experience when analyzing
race relations, viz, Peller, supra note 22, and TONRY, supra note 17.
133. Butler, supra note 2, at 853.
134. This critique has been expressed by several members of the current
Supreme Court. For example, after comparing a congressional mandate of racial
preferences in FCC licensing policies to Jim Crow segregation, South Africa's
apartheid, and the Nazi citizenship laws, Justice Kennedy observed that "the FCC
policy seems based on the demeaning notion that members of the defined racial
groups ascribe to certain 'minority views' that must be different from those of other
citizens." Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S.
547, 636 (1990).
135. Butler, supra note 2, at 853.
136. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
137. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 547.
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but not troubled by his own universalizing in the context of the
criminal law?
My own position is that, while conceding that it can be both
over- and under-inclusive, race has been, and in many respects
still is, a fairly accurate proxy for group-identified perspectives.
Families, neighborhoods, and racial groups have shared narratives that construct individual and collective understandings of
race. 138 We have fairly reliable data that proves that groups have
shared perspectives with respect to voting; African Americans
tend to vote for African American candidates, just as Latinos/as
tend to vote for Latino/a candidates. Consequently, we have
racial redistricting. We also know that members of different
racial groups prefer to be treated by doctors from their own racial
group. 139 Madison Avenue knows that products from cars to jeans
can be effectively marketed to discrete racial groups. Several
cosmetic companies have developed make-up lines that target
African American women, while others target Latinas. All of this
is evidence of group preferences, of race operating as a proxy for
ideas, viewpoints, and desires.
Any expansion of affirmative action programs beyond the
confines of identified discrimination depends on a diversity
rationale, for example, seeing race as at least an adequate proxy
for viewpoints and ideas. Consequently, if one understands race
as an attribute that is irrational and, therefore, something to be
overcome, then race-based diversity programs are implicitly
wrong. 140 If, on the other hand, one understands race as a
positive source of personal and collective identity that provides a
meaningful connection to a racialized community's past, then
race-based programs are desirable, and, indeed, crucial for racial
justice. 141

138. See Montoya, supra note 118 (analyzing how narratives construct and
transform personal and collective identities while mediating the hegemonic effects
of the legal system's construction of our formal legal identities).
139. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1498 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) ("On average, black physicians care for nearly six times as many black
patients and Hispanic physicians care for nearly three times as many Hispanic
patients as other physicians.'), uacated, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997).
140. For an example of this conceptualization, see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d
932, 945 (5th Cir.) (Smith, J.) (''The use of race, in and of itself, to choose students
simply achieves a student body that looks different. Such a criterion is no more
rational on its own terms than would be choices based upon the physical size or blood
type of applicants."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
141. Professor Peller writes,
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Affirmative action fosters a greater diversity of perspectives
within racial groups. Persons who benefit from racial preferences
are likely to have different life experiences, that is, holding better
jobs or enjoying better educational opportunities and less overt
discrimination. As a result, they are likely to develop different
values, preferences, and perspectives, and perhaps more openmindedness than those persons from their racial group who have
not so benefited. For this reason, I would venture to guess that
there is much greater diversity of opinion about Professor Butler's
proposals among African American lawyers, judges, and law
professors than among lower income African Americans.

C. Cross-Fertilizing Analyses of White Supremacy
Those of us who focus on increasing racial justice through the
civil law can conclude, at least at moments, that the society's
mechanisms for racial oppression have weakened. Those who
focus on the injustices of the criminal law have not been so
sanguine. Professor Butler's interdisciplinary paper reminds us
that constant study of the interrelated mechanisms of the civil
and criminal systems is the only means of arriving at a fuller
understanding of the self-sustaining nature of white supremacy.
Professor Butler laudably seeks to transpose the nascent benefits
of affirmative action in the civil law upon the criminal system as
a possible remedy for comparable racial injustices. Linking the
correlative effects of the criminal and civil systems is Professor
Butler's thematic objective. His analysis attempts to subvert
criminal justice systems that disproportionately discriminate
against African Americans by invoking the emancipatory
potential of race-based civil law decisions. I enthusiastically
endorse his attempt to develop this linkage.

[Black] nationalists contended that racial identities were historic,
meaningful and constituitive of the Black community's and Black people's
individual identity. For nationalists, it wasn't race consciousness that
marked racism, but rather the hierarchical power relations that defined
white and black communities.... From the nationalist view, the idea of
transcending racial identity in the name of "colorblindness" and
"integrationism" was.an invitation to assimilation to white culture and
a corresponding "painless genocide" of the Black community.
Peller, supra note 22, at 2249. For a detailed description of the emergence of
Chicano student activists in the late 1960s and the history of the Chicano Power
Movement within more nationalized social protests, see CARLOS MUNOZ, JR., YOUTH,
IDENTITY, POWER: THE CHICANO MOVEMENT (5th prtg. 1993).
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We who support and defend race-based preferences have not
done enough work to understand how both liberal and conservative programs have created fissures in the structures of subordination; civil affirmative action has widened these fissures by
granting some people of color greater opportunity and economic
security. Many of these programs have been a ''brain drain" on
communities of color. Those who could leave the inner city, the
barrio, or the ghetto often did so with devastating consequences
for the communities of color who were left with few role models,
thin tax bases, and deteriorating infrastructures. The absence of
criminal affirmative action has exacted and exacerbated tremendous suffering from the poorest sectors of our communities. Thus,
white elites have maintained their power by loosening their hold
on some segments of the society while concurrently tightening
their grip on communities of color at the lower end of the economic spectrum. This reality is evidenced by the fact that some
of us are considerably better off-even as members of our
extended families or other parts of our racial and ethnic communities are caught in conditions of deplorable deprivation. Such
conditions, not surprisingly, contribute to increased criminality
by some people of color; this, in turn, reinforces attitudes of racial
bigotry not only among some whites but also among some people
of color. These perceptions lead to inter-group as well as intragroup racial tensions and disunity.
CONCLUSION

Affirmative action analyses that focus on institutions of
higher education, 142 glass ceilings, 143 set asides, 144 and radio
licenses146 do not directly address the problems of communities of
color struggling to survive on a day-to-day basis. Professor
Butler's article forces our attention on those at the bottom: 146

142. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
143. See GLASS CEILING REPORT, supra note 48.
144. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448 (1980).
145. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497
U.S. 547 (1990).
.
146. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) (urging criticalists to listen to
and learn from the stories of people at the bottom).
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those he calls "the most dangerous and pathetic victims: black
criminals." 147 Intense collaboration between those of us who
teach and write about race-based decisionmaking by governmental and private entities and those who work to reform and
transform criminal justice systems is a prerequisite to bringing
about effective social change.
Affirmative action mechanisms have been indispensable to
the integration of this society; affirmative action programs are of .
continuing value because racial integration is always contested
by the white majority and, as a result, integration remains only
partial. I agree with Professor Butler that the extreme overrepresentation of men, and more recently women, of color in
prisons and jails is the most blatant example of the continued
vitality of white supremacy. 148 The criminalization decisions of
this society-what is deemed a crime, who gets charged, who gets
convicted, who is deprived of adequate legal assistance, who gets
incarcerated and for how long, together with the demonization
and discarding of young offender~xpose how societal processes
ofracialization change and adapt slowly over time, while simultaneously preserving the advantages of whites over non-whites in
the racial hierarchy. 149 Thus, the lives of far too many African
Americans are being wasted by their disproportionate representation within prisons. Professor Butler is an eloquent and passionate advocate for the need to radically transform the federal and
state criminal justice systems.
In closing, let me express the hope that symposia such as this
one will explore explanations for how and why constructs of "race"
have condemned too many African Americans and others to live

147. Butler, supra note 2, at 845.
148. For a provocative discussion of the similarities in form and substance
between penitentiaries and slavery, see ADAM JAY HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE
PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY AMERICA (1992). Drawing
connections between chattel slavery and penal slavery, Hirsch writes that "because
of the high rate of recidivism, many more convicts became, in effect, permanent
residents of the penitentiary." Id. at 74.
149. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White
Fears-On the Social Construction of Threat, in THE RODGRIGO CHRONICLES:
CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE (1995) (using the fictional mugging of a
law professor to illustrate how the white family structure contributes to the
antisocial behaviors that engender white-collar crime. The resultant costs to society
greatly surpass those of street crimes; yet, such crimes are rarely prosecuted
vigorously, and, more importantly, the perpetrators are not vilified.).
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in "iron cages." 160 Perhaps the safety, economic security, and
ideological distance the ivory tower provides those of us who have
escaped the barrio or the ghetto will allow us to gestate ideas and
implement strategies that materially improve the lives of the
most marginalized individuals and our respective communities.

150. See TAKAKI, supra note 32.

